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1 Introdution
Radio regulatory bodies are reently reognizing that rigid spetrum assignment granting exlusive use to
liensed servies is highly ineient., due to the high variability of the tra statistis aross time, spae,
and frequeny. Reent Federal Communiations Commission (FCC) measurements show that, in fat,
the spetrum usage is typially onentrated over ertain portions of the spetrum, while a signiant
amount of the liensed bands (or idle slots in stati time division multiple aess systems with bursty
tra) remains unused or underutilized for ninety perent of time [1℄. It is not surprising then that
this ineieny is motivating a urry of researh ativities in engineering, eonomis and regulation
ommunities in the eort of nding more eient spetrum management poliies.
As pointed out in many reent works [2, 3, 4, 5℄, the most appropriate approah to takle the great
spetrum variability as a funtion of time and spae alls for dynami aess strategies that adapt to
the eletromagneti environment. Cognitive Radio (CR) originated as a possible solution to this problem
[6℄ obtained by endowing the radio nodes with ognitive apabilities, e.g., the ability to sense the
eletromagneti environment, make short term preditions, and reat intelligently in order to optimize
the usage of the available resoures. Multiple paradigms assoiated with CR have been proposed [2, 3, 4, 5℄,
depending on the poliy to be followed with respet to the liensed users, i.e. the users who have aquired
the right to transmit over spei portions of the spetrum buying the relative liense. The most ommon
strategies adopt a hierarhial aess struture, distinguishing between primary users, or legay spetrum
holders, and seondary users, who aess the liensed spetrum dynamially, under the onstraint of not
induing Quality of Servie (QoS) degradations intolerable to the primary users. Within this ontext,
three basi approahes have been onsidered to allow onurrent ommuniations: spetrum overlay,
underlay and interweave.
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1
There is no strit onsensus on some of the basi terminology in ognitive systems [4℄. Here we use interweave as in [5℄
whih is sometimes referred to as overlay ommuniations [4℄.
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In overlay systems, as proposed in [7℄, seondary users alloate part of their power for seondary
transmissions and the remainder to assist (relay) the primary transmissions. By exploiting sophistiated
oding tehniques suh as dirty paper oding based on the knowledge of the primary users' message and/or
odebook at the ognitive transmitter, these systems oer the possibility of onurrent transmissions
without apaity penalties. However, although interesting from an information theoreti perspetive,
these tehniques are diult to implement as they require nonausal knowledge of the primary signals at
the ognitive transmitters.
In underlay systems, the seondary users are also allowed to share resoures with the primary users,
but without any knowledge about the primary users' signals and under the strit onstraint that the
spetral density of their transmitted signals fall below the noise oor at the primary reeivers. This
interferene onstraint an be met using spread spetrum or ultra-wideband ommuniations from the
seondary users. Both transmission tehniques do not require the estimation of the eletromagneti
environment from seondary users, but they are mostly appropriate for short distane ommuniations,
beause of the strong onstraints imposed on the maximum power radiated by the seondary users.
Conversely, interweave ommuniations, initially envisioned in [6℄, are based on an opportunisti or
adaptive usage of the spetrum, as a funtion of its real utilization. Seondary users are allowed to adapt
their power alloation as a funtion of time and frequeny, depending on what they are able to sense
and learn from the environment, in a nonintrusive manner. Rather than imposing a severe onstraint on
their transmit power spetral density, in interweave systems, the seondary users have to gure out when
and where to transmit. Dierently from underlay systems, this opportunisti spetrum aess requires an
opportunity identiation phase, through spetrum sensing, followed by an opportunity exploitation mode
[4℄. For a fasinating motivation and disussion of the signal proessing hallenges faed in interweave
ognitive radio systems, we suggest the interested reader to refer to [2℄.
In this paper we fous on opportunisti resoure alloation tehniques in hierarhial ognitive net-
works, as they seem to be the most suitable for the urrent spetrum management poliies and legay
wireless systems [4℄. We are speially interested in devising the most appropriate form of onurrent
ommuniations of ognitive users ompeting over the physial resoures let available from primary users.
Looking at opportunisti ommuniation paradigm from a broad signal proessing perspetive, the se-
ondary users are allowed to transmit over a multi-dimensional spae, whose oordinates represent time
slots, frequeny bins and (possibly) angles, and their goal is to nd out the most appropriate transmission
strategy, assuming a given power budget at eah node, exploring all available degrees of freedom, under
the onstraint of induing a limited interferene, or no interferene at all, at the primary users.
In general, the optimization of the transmission strategies requires the presene of a entral node
having full knowledge of all the hannels and interferene struture at every reeiver. But this poses a
serious implementation problem in terms of salability and amount of signaling to be exhanged among
the nodes. The required extra signaling ould, in the end, jeopardize the promise for higher eieny.
To overome this diulty, we onentrate on deentralized strategies, where the ognitive users are able
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to self-enfore the negotiated agreements on the spetrum usage without the intervention of a entralized
authority. The philosophy underlying this approah is a ompetitive optimality riterion, as every user
aims for the transmission strategy that unilaterally maximizes his own payo funtion. The presene of
onurrent seondary users ompeting over the same resoures adds dynamis to the system, as every
seondary user will dynamially reat to the strategies adopted by the other users. The main question
is then to establish whether, and under what onditions, the overall system an eventually onverge
to an equilibrium from whih every user is not willing to unilaterally move, as this would determine a
performane loss. This form of equilibrium oinides with the well-known onept of Nash Equilibrium
(NE) in game theory (see, e.g., [8, 9℄). In fat, game theory is the natural tool to devise deentralized
strategies allowing the seondary users to nd out their best response to any given hannel and interferene
senario and to derive the onditions for the existene and uniqueness of NE.
Within this ontext, in this paper, we propose and analyze a totally deentralized approah to design
ognitive MIMO transeivers, satisfying a ompetitive optimality riterion, based on the ahievement
of Nash equilibria. To take full advantage of all the opportunities oered by wireless ommuniations,
we assume a fairly general MIMO setup, where the multiple hannels may be frequeny hannels (as
in OFDM systems) [10℄-[12℄, time slots (as in TDMA systems) [10, 11℄, and/or spatial hannels (as in
transmit/reeive beamforming systems) [13℄. Whenever available, multiple antennas at the seondary
transmitters ould be used, for example, to put nulls in the antenna radiation pattern of seondary
transmitters along the diretions identifying the primary reeivers, thus enabling the share of frequeny
and time resoures with no additional interferene. Our initial goal is to provide onditions for the
existene and uniqueness of NE points in a game where seondary users ompete against eah other to
maximize their performane, under the onstraint on the maximum (or null) interferene indued on the
primary users. The next step is then to desribe low-omplex totally distributed tehniques able to reah
the equilibrium points of the proposed games, with no oordination among the seondary users.
2 System Model: Cognitive Radio Networks
We onsider a senario omposed by heterogeneous wireless systems (primary and seondary users), as
illustrated in Figure 1. The setup may inlude peer-to-peer links, multiple aess, or broadast hannels.
The systems oexisting in the network do not have a ommon goal and do not ooperate with eah other.
Moreover, no entralized authority is assumed to handle the network aess from seondary users. Thus,
the seondary users are allowed, in priniple, to ompete for the same physial resoures, e.g., time,
frequeny, and spae. We are interested in nding the optimal transmission strategy for the seondary
users, using a deentralized approah. A fairly general system model to desribe the signals reeived by
the seondary users is the Gaussian vetor interferene hannel:
yq = Hqqxq +
∑
r 6=q
Hrqxr + nq, (1)
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Figure 1: Hierarhial ognitive radio network with primary and seondary users.
where xq is the nTq -dimensional blok of data transmitted by soure q, Hqq is the nRq × nTq (omplex)
hannel matrix between the q-th transmitter and its intended reeiver, Hrq is the nRq ×nTr ross-hannel
matrix between soure r and destination q, yq is the nRq -dimensional vetor reeived by destination q, and
nq is the nRq -dimensional noise plus interferene vetor. The rst term in the right-hand side of (1) is the
useful signal for link q, the seond and third terms represent the Multi-User Interferene (MUI) reeived
by seondary user q and aused from the other seondary users and the primary users, respetively. The
vetor nq is assumed to be zero-mean irularly symmetri omplex Gaussian with arbitrary (nonsingular)
ovariane matrix Rnq . For the sake of simpliity and lak of spae, we onsider here only the ase where
the hannel matries Hqq are square nonsingular. We assume that eah reeiver is able to estimate the
hannel from its intended transmitter and the overall MUI ovariane matrix (alternatively, to make
short term preditions, with negligible error).
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The reeiver sends then this information bak to the
transmitter through a low bit rate (error-free) feedbak hannel, to allow the transmitter to ompute the
optimal transmission strategy over its own link.
The model in (1) represents a fairly general MIMO setup, desribing multiuser transmissions over
multiple hannels, whih may represent frequeny hannels (as in OFDM systems) [10℄-[12℄, time slots (as
in TDMA systems) [10, 11℄, or spatial hannels (as in transmit/reeive beamforming systems) [13℄. Dif-
ferently from traditional stati or entralized spetrum assignment, the ognitive radio paradigm enables
seondary users to transmit with overlapping spetrum and/or overage with primary users, provided
that the degradation indued on the primary users' performane is null or tolerable. How to impose inter-
ferene onstraints on seondary users is a omplex and open regulatory issue [2, 4℄. Roughly speaking,
restritive onstraints may marginalize the potential gains oered by the dynami resoure assignment
mehanism, whereas loose onstraints may aet the ompatibility with legay systems. Both determinis-
ti and probabilisti interferene onstraints have been suggested in the literature [1, 2, 4, 15℄, namely: the
2
How to obtain both hannel-state information and MUI ovariane matrix estimation goes beyond the sope of this
paper; the interested reader may refer to, e.g., [2, 4℄, where lassial signal proessing estimation tehniques are properly
modied to be suessfully applied in a ognitive radio environment.
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maximum MUI interferene power level pereived by any ative primary user (the so-alled interferene
temperature limit) [1, 2℄ and the maximum probability that the MUI interferene level at eah primary
user's reeiver may exeed a presribed threshold [4, 15℄. In the presene of sensing errors, the aess to
hannels identied as idle should also depend on the goodness of the hannel estimation. As shown in
[17℄, in this ase the optimal strategy is probabilisti, with an probability depending on both the false
alarm and miss probabilities.
In this paper we are primarily interested in analyzing the ontention among the seondary users over
a multiuser hannel where there are primary users as well. To limit the omplexity of the problem, in the
eort to nd out distributed tehniques guaranteed to onverge to NE points, we restrit our analysis to
onsider only deterministi interferene onstraints, albeit expressed in a very general form. In partiular,
we envisage the use of the following possible interferene onstraints (see also Figure 2):
Co.1 Maximum transmit power for eah transmitter :
E
{
‖xq‖22
}
= Tr (Qq) ≤ Pq, (2)
where Qq denotes the ovariane matrix of the symbols transmitted by user q and Pq is the transmit
power in units of energy per transmission.
Co.2 Null onstraints:
UHq Qq = 0, (3)
where Uq is a strit tall matrix (to avoid the trivial solution Qq = 0), whose olumns represent the spatial
and/or the frequeny diretions along with user q is not allowed to transmit. We assume, without loss
of generality (w.l.o.g.), that eah matrix Uq is full-olumn rank.
Co.3 Soft shaping onstraints:
Tr
(
GHq QqGq
) ≤ P aveq , (4)
where the matries Gq are suh that their range spae identies the subspae where the interferene level
should be kept under the required threshold.
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Co.4 Peak power onstraints: the average peak power of eah user q an be ontrolled by onstraining the
maximum eigenvalue [denoted by λmax(·)℄ of the transmit ovariane matrix along the diretions spanned
by the olumn spae of Gq:
λmax
(
GHq QqGq
) ≤ P peakq , (5)
where P peakq is the maximum peak power that an be transmitted along the spatial and/or the frequeny
diretions spanned by the olumn spae of Gq.
3
The interferene temperature limit onstraint [2℄ is given by the aggregated interferene indued by all seondary users.
In this paper, we assume that the primary user imposing the soft onstraint, has already omputed the maximum tolerable
interferene power P
ave
q for eah seondary user. The power limit P
ave
q an also be the result of a negotiation or opportunisti
based proedure between primary users (or regulatory agenies) and seondary users.
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Figure 2: Example of null/soft shaping onstraints.
The struture of the null onstraints in (3) is a very general form to express the strit limitation
imposed on seondary users to prevent them from transmitting over the subhannels oupied by the
primary users. These subhannels are modeled as vetors belonging to the subspae spanned by the
olumns of eah matrix Uq . This form inludes, as partiular ases, the imposition of nulls over: 1) the
frequeny bands oupied by the primary reeivers; 2) the time slots oupied by the primary users; 3)
the angular diretions identifying the primary reeivers as observed from the seondary transmitters. In
the rst ase, the subspae is spanned by a set of IFFT vetors, in the seond ase by a set of anonial
vetors, and in the third ase by the set of steering vetors representing the diretions of the primary
reeivers as observed from the seondary transmitters. It is worth emphasizing that the struture of the
null onstraints in (3) is muh more general than the three ases mentioned above, as it an inorporate
any ombination of the frequeny, time and spae oordinates.
The use of the spatial domain an greatly improve the apabilities of ognitive users, as it allows
them to transmit over the same frequeny band but without interfering. This is possible if the seondary
transmitters have an antenna array and use a beamforming that puts nulls over the diretions identifying
the primary reeivers. Of ourse, this requires the identiation of the primary reeivers, a task that is
muh more demanding than the detetion of primary transmitters [4℄. As an example, there are some
reent works showing that, in the appliation of CR over the spetrum alloated to ommerial TV,
one might exploit the loal osillator leakage power emitted by the RF front end of the TV reeiver to
loate the reeivers [18℄. Of ourse, in suh a ase, the detetion range is quite short and this alls for
a deployment of sensors very lose to the potential reeivers. A dierent senario pertains to ellular
systems. In suh a ase, the mobile users might be rather hard to loate and trak. However, the base
stations are relatively easier to identify. Hene, in a ellular system operating in a time-division duplexing
(TDD) mode, the seondary users ould exploit the time slot alloated for the uplink hannel and put a
null in the diretion of the base stations. This would avoid any interferene towards the ellular system
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users, without the need of traking the mobile users.
The soft shaping onstraints expressed in (4) and (5) represent a onstraint on the total average and
peak average power radiated (projeted) along the diretions spanned by the olumn spae of matrix
Gq. They are a relaxed form of (3) and an be used to keep the portion of the interferene temperature
generated by eah seondary user q under the desired value. In fat, under (4)-(5), the seondary users
are allowed to transmit over some subhannels oupied by the primary users, but only provided that
the interferene that they generate falls below a presribed threshold. For example, in a MIMO setup,
the matrix Gq in (4) would ontain, in its olumns, the steering vetors identifying the diretions of the
primary reeivers.
Within the assumptions made above, invoking the apaity expression for the single user Gaussian
MIMO hannel−ahievable using random Gaussian odes by all the users−the maximum information rate
on link q for a given set of users' ovariane matries Q1, . . . ,QQ, is [19℄
Rq(Qq,Q−q) = log det
(
I+HHqqR
−1
−qHqqQq
)
(6)
where
R−q , Rnq +
∑
r 6=q
HrqQrH
H
rq (7)
is the MUI plus noise ovariane matrix observed by user q and Q−q , (Qr)r 6=q is the set of all the users'
ovariane matries, exept the q-th one. Observe that R−q depends on the strategies Q−q of the other
players.
3 Resoure Sharing among Seondary Users based on Game Theory
Given the multiuser nature of the senario desribed above, the design of the optimal transmission strate-
gies of seondary users would require a multiobjetive formulation of the optimization problem, as the
information rate ahieved on eah seondary user's link onstitutes a dierent single objetive fun-
tion. The globally optimal solutions of suh a problem−the Pareto optimal surfae of the multiobjetive
problem−would dene the largest rate region ahievable by seondary users, given the power onstraints
Co.1-Co.4: the rate vetor prole R(Q⋆) , [R1(Q
⋆), . . . , RQ(Q
⋆)] is Pareto optimal if there exists no
other rate prole R(Q) that dominates R(Q⋆) omponent-wise, i.e., R(Q⋆) ≥ R(Q), for all feasible Q's,
where at least one inequality is strit.
Unfortunately, the omputation of the rate region is analytially intratable and thus not appliable
in a ognitive radio senario, sine every salar/multiobjetive optimization problem involving the rates of
seondary users in (6) is not onvex (implied from the fat that the rates Rq(Q) are nononave funtions
of the ovariane matries Q). Furthermore, even in the simpler ase of transmissions over SISO parallel
hannels, the network utility maximization (NUM) problem based on the rates funtions (6) has been
proved in [24℄ to be a strongly NP-hard problem, under various pratial settings as well as dierent
7
hoies of the system utility funtion (e.g., sum-rate, weighted sum-rate, geometri rate-mean). Roughly
speaking, this means that there is no hope to obtain an algorithm, even entralized, that an eiently
ompute the exat globally optimal solution. Although in theory, the rate region ould be still found by an
exhaustive searh through all possible feasible ovariane matries, the omputational omplexity of this
approah is prohibitively high, given the large number of variables and users involved in the optimization.
The situation is partiularly ritial in CR systems, where the ognitive users sense a very large spetrum.
Consequently, suboptimal algorithms have been proposed in the literature to solve speial ases of the
proposed optimization [20℄-[23℄, most of them dealing with the maximization of the (weighted) sum-rate
in SISO frequeny-seletive interferene hannels (obtained from our general model when the hannel
matries are diagonal, the ovariane matries redue to the power alloation vetors, and the null/soft
shaping onstraints are removed) [20, 21℄. Due to the nononvex nature of the problem, these algorithms
either lak global onvergene or may onverge to poor spetrum sharing strategies.
Furthermore, even if one deides to employ a suboptimal method, e.g., [20℄-[23℄, the algorithms are
not suitable for CR systems as they are entralized and thus annot be implemented in a distributed way.
These tehniques require a entral authority (or node in the network) with knowledge of the (diret and
ross-) hannels to ompute all the transmission strategies for the dierent nodes and then to broadast
the solution. This sheme would learly pose a serious implementation problem in terms of salability of
the network and amount of signaling to be exhanged among the nodes, whih makes suh an approah
not appealing in the senario onsidered in this paper.
To overome the above diulties and reah a better trade-o between performane and omplexity, we
shift our fous to a dierent notion of optimality: the ompetitive optimality riterion; whih motivates a
game theoretial formulation of the system design. Using the onept of NE as the ompetitive optimality
riterion, the resoure alloation problem among seondary users is then ast as a strategi nonooperative
game, in whih the players are the seondary users and the payo funtions are the information rates on
eah link: Eah seondary user q ompetes against the others by hoosing the transmit ovariane matrix
Qq (i.e., his strategy) that maximizes his own information rate Rq(Qq,Q−q) in (6), given onstraints
imposed by the presene of the primary users, besides the usual onstraint on transmit power. A NE of
the game is reahed when eah user, given the strategy proles of the others, does not get any rate inrease
by unilaterally hanging his own strategy. The rst question to answer under suh framework is whether
suh an overall dynamial system an eventually onverge to an equilibrium point, while preserving the
QoS of primary users. The seond basi issue is if the optimal strategies to be adopted by eah user an
be omputed in a totally deentralized way. We address both questions in the forthoming setions.
For the sake of simpliity, we start onsidering only onstraints Co.1 and Co.2. These onstraints
are suitable to model interweave ommuniations among seondary users where, in general, there are
restritions on when and where they may transmit (this an be done using the null onstraints Co.2).
Then, we allow underlay and interweave ommuniations simultaneously, by inluding in the optimization
also interferene onstraints Co.3 and Co.4.
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3.1 Rate maximization game with null onstraints
Given the rate funtions in (6) and onstraints Co.1-Co.2, the rate maximization game is formally dened
as:
(G1) :
maximize
Qq0
Rq(Qq,Q−q)
subject to Tr (Qq) ≤ Pq, UHq Qq = 0
∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (8)
where Q is the number of players (the seondary users) and Rq(Qq,Q−q) is the payo funtion of player
q, dened in (6). Without the null onstraints, the solution of eah optimization problem in (8) would
lead to the well-known MIMO waterlling solution [19℄. The presene of the null onstraints modies the
problem and the solution for eah user is not neessarily a waterlling anymore. Nevertheless, we show
now that introduing a proper projetion matrix the solutions of (8) an still be eiently omputed via
a waterlling-like expression. To this end, we rewrite game G1 in a more onvenient form as detailed next.
Introduing the projetion matrix PR(Uq)⊥ = I −Uq(UHq Uq)−1UHq (the orthogonal projetion onto
R(Uq)⊥, where R(·) is the range spae operator), it follows from the onstraint UHq Qq = 0 that any
optimal Qq in (8) will always satisfy:
Qq = PR(Uq)⊥QqPR(Uq)⊥ . (9)
The game G1 an then be equivalently rewritten as:
maximize
Qq0
log det
(
I+ H˜HqqR˜
−1
−qH˜qqQq
)
subject to Tr (Qq) ≤ Pq
Qq = PR(Uq)⊥QqPR(Uq)⊥
∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (10)
where eah H˜rq , HrqPR(Ur)⊥ is a modied hannel and R˜−q , Rnq +
∑
r 6=q
H˜rqQrH˜
H
rq. At this point,
the problem an be further simplied by noting that the onstraint Qq = PR(U⊥q ) QqPR(U⊥q ) in (10) is
redundant. The nal formulation then beomes:
maximize
Qq0
log det
(
I+ H˜HqqR˜
−1
−qH˜qqQq
)
subject to Tr(Qq) ≤ Pq
∀q = 1, · · · , Q. (11)
This is due to the fat that, for any user q, any optimal solutionQ⋆q in (11)−the MIMO waterlling solution
[13℄−will be orthogonal to the null spae of H˜qq, whatever R˜−q is, implying Q⋆q = PR(Uq)⊥Q⋆qPR(Uq)⊥ .
Building on the equivalene of (8) and (11), we an apply the results in [13℄ to the game in (11) and
derive the struture of the Nash equilibria of game G1, as detailed next.
Nash equilibria of game G1: Game G1 always admits a NE, for any set of hannel matries, transmit
power of the users, and null onstraints, sine it is a onave game (the payo of eah player is a onave
funtion in his own strategy and eah admissible strategy set is onvex and ompat) [13℄. Moreover,
it follows from (11) that all the Nash equilibria of G1 satisfy the following set of nonlinear matrix-value
xed-point equations [13℄:
Q⋆q = W˜Fq
(
H˜HqqR
−1
−q(Q
⋆
−q)H˜qq
)
, W⋆q Diag
(
p⋆q
)
W⋆Hq , ∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (12)
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where we made expliit the dependene of R−q on Q
⋆
−q as R−q(Q
⋆
−q); the W
⋆
q = Wq(Q
⋆
−q) is the
semi-unitary matrix with olumns equal to the eigenvetors of matrix H˜HqqR
−1
−q(Q
⋆
−q)H˜qq orresponding
to the positive eigenvalues λ⋆q,k = λq,k(Q
⋆
−q), with R−q(Q−q) dened in (7); and the power alloation
p⋆q = pq(Q
⋆
−q) satises the following simultaneous waterlling equation: for all k and q,
p⋆q(k) =
(
µq −
1
λ⋆q,k
)+
, (13)
with (x)+ , max(0, x) and µq hosen to satisfy the power onstraint
∑
k p
⋆
q(k) = Pq .
Interestingly, the solution (12) shows that the null onstraints in the transmissions of seondary users
an be handled without aeting the omputational omplexity: The optimal transmission strategy of
eah user q an be eiently omputed via a MIMO waterlling solution, provided that the original
hannel matrix Hqq is replaed by H˜qq.
This result has an intuitive interpretation: To guarantee that eah user q does not transmit over a
given subspae (spanned by the olumns of Uq), whihever the strategies of the other users are, while
maximizing his information rate, one only needs to indue in the hannel matrix Hqq a null spae that
oinides with the subspae where the transmission is not allowed. This is preisely what is done by
introduing the modied hannel H˜qq.
The waterlling-like struture of the Nash equilibria as given in (12) along with the interpretation
of the MIMO watelling solution as a matrix projetion onto a proper onvex set as given in [13℄ play
a key role in studying the uniqueness of the NE and in deriving onditions for the onvergene of the
distributed algorithms desribed in Setion 4. The analysis of the uniqueness of the NE goes beyond the
sope of this paper and it is addressed in [14℄. What is important to remark here is that, as expeted,
the onditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the NE impose a onstraint on the maximum level of MUI
generated by seondary users that may be tolerated in the network. But, interestingly, the uniqueness of
the equilibrium is not aeted by the interferene generated by the primary users.
3.2 Rate maximization game with null onstraints via virtual noise shaping
In this setion, we show that an alternative approah to impose null onstraints Co.2 on the transmissions
of seondary users passes through the introdution of virtual interferers. The idea behind this alterna-
tive approah an be easily understood if one onsiders the transmission over SISO frequeny-seletive
hannels, where all the hannel matries have the same eigenvetors (the FFT vetors): to avoid the use
of a given subhannel, it is suient to introdue a virtual noise with suiently high power over that
subhannel. The same idea annot be diretly applied to the MIMO ase, as arbitrary MIMO hannel
matries have dierent right/left singular vetors from eah other. Nevertheless, we show how to design
the ovariane matrix of the virtual noise (to be added to the noise ovariane matrix of eah seondary
reeiver), so that the all the Nash equilibria of the game satisfy the null onstraint Co.2 along the speied
diretions.
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Let us onsider the following strategi nonooperative game:
(Gα) :
maximize
Qq0
log det
(
I+HHqqR
−1
−q,αHqqQq
)
subject to Tr (Qq) ≤ Pq
∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (14)
where
R−q,α , R−q + αUˆqUˆ
H
q = Rnq +
∑
r 6=q
HrqQrH
H
rq + αUˆqUˆ
H
q , (15)
denotes the MUI-plus-noise ovariane matrix observed by seondary user q, plus the ovariane matrix
αUˆqUˆ
H
q of the virtual interferene along R(Uˆq), where Uˆq is a tall matrix and α is a positive onstant.
Our interest is on deriving the asymptoti properties of the solutions of Gα, as α → +∞. To this end,
we introdue the following intermediate denitions rst. For eah q, dene the tall matrix Uˆ⊥q suh that
R(Uˆ⊥q ) = R(Uˆq)⊥, and the modied hannel matries
Hˆrq = Uˆ
⊥H
q Hrq ∀r, q = 1, · · · , Q. (16)
We then introdue the auxiliary game G∞, dened as:
(G∞) :
maximize
Qq0
log det
(
I+ HˆHqqRˆ
−1
−qHˆqqQq
)
subject to Tr (Qq) ≤ Pq
∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (17)
where
Rˆ−q , Uˆ
⊥H
q RnqUˆ
⊥
q +
∑
r 6=q
HˆrqQrHˆ
H
rq. (18)
It an be shown that games Gα and G∞ are asymptotially equivalent in the sense speied next.
Nash equilibria of games Gα and G∞: Games Gα and G∞ always admit a NE, for any set of hannel
matries, power onstraints, and α > 0. Moreover, under mild onditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of
the NE of both games (denoted by Q⋆α and Q
⋆
∞, respetively), we have:
lim
α→∞
Q⋆α = Q
⋆
∞, (19)
i.e., the NE of Gα asymptotially oinides with that of G∞.
Observe that, similarly to game G1, also in games Gα and G∞, the best-response of eah player an be
eiently omputed via MIMO waterlling-like solutions, and the Nash equilibria of both games satisfy
a simultaneous waterlling equation.
Using (19), one an derive the asymptoti properties of the (unique) NE of game Gα as α → ∞,
through the properties of the equilibrium Q⋆∞ of G∞. Following a similar approah as in Setion 3.1, one
an show that eah Q⋆q,∞ satises the following ondition
UHq Q
⋆
q,∞ = 0, with Uq , H
−1
qq Uˆq. (20)
Condition (20) provides, for eah user q, the desired relationship between the diretions of the virtual
noise to be introdued in the noise ovariane matrix of the user (see (18))−the matrix Uˆq−and the real
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diretions along with user q will not alloate any power, i.e., the matrix Uq. It turns out that if user q is
not allowed to alloate power along Uq, it is suient to hoose in (18) Uˆq , HqqUq.
Sine the existene and uniqueness of the NE of game Gα do not depend on α, the (unique) NE of
Gα (that in general will depend on the value of α) an be reahed using the asynhronous algorithms
desribed in Setion 4, irrespetive of the value of α. Thus, for suiently large values of α, the NE of
Gα tends to satisfy ondition (20); whih provides an alternative way to impose onstraint Co.2.
3.3 Rate maximization game with soft and null onstraints
We fous now on the rate maximization in the presene of both null and soft shaping onstraints. The
resulting game an be formulated as follows:
(G2) :
maximize
Qq0
Rq(Qq,Q−q)
subject to Tr
(
GHq QqGq
) ≤ P aveq
λmax
(
GHq QqGq
) ≤ P peakq
UHq Qq = 0
∀q = 1, · · · , Q. (21)
We assume w.l.o.g. that eah Gq is a full-row rank matrix, so that the soft shaping onstraint in (21)
imposes a onstraint on the average transmit power radiated by user q in the whole spae.
The soft onstraints in (21) are the result of a onstraint on the overall interferene temperature limit
imposed by the primary users [2℄. Typially, the most stringent onditions between the power onstraints
Co.1 and Co.3 is the soft shaping onstraint Co.3. This motivates the absene in (21) of the power
onstraint Co.1, although it ould also be onsidered.
Nash equilibria of game G2: We an derive the struture of the Nash equilibria of game G2, similarly
to what we did for game G1. For eah q ∈ Ω, dene the tall matrix Uq , G♯qUq, where G♯q denotes the
Monroe-Penrose pseudoinverse of Gq [25℄, introdue the projetion matrix PR(Uq)⊥ = I−Uq(U
H
q Uq)
−1
U
H
q (the orthogonal projetion onto R(Uq)⊥) and the modied hannel matries
Hrq = HrqG
♯H
r PR(Ur)⊥ , r, q = 1, · · · , Q. (22)
Using the above denition, we an now haraterize the Nash equilibria of game G2, as shown next.
The game G2 admits a NE, for any set of hannel matries and null/soft shaping onstraints. Moreover,
every NE satises the following set of nonlinear matrix-value xed-point equations:
Q⋆q = G
♯H
q WFq
(
H
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q
⋆
−q)Hqq
)
G
♯
q
, G
♯H
q V
⋆
q diag
(
p⋆q
)
V⋆Hq G
♯
q
∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (23)
where V⋆q = Vq(Q
⋆
−q) is the semi-unitary matrix with olumns equal to the eigenvetors of matrix
H
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q
⋆
−q)Hqq, with R−q(Q−q) dened in (7), orresponding to the L¯q = rank(Hqq) positive eigen-
values λ⋆q,k = λq,k(Q
⋆
−q), and the power alloation p
⋆
q = pq(Q
⋆
−q) satises the following simultaneous
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waterlling equation: for all k and q,
p⋆q(k) =


[
µq − 1λ⋆q,k
]P peakq
0
, if P peakq L¯q > P
ave
q ,
P peakq , otherwise,
(24)
where [·]P
peak
q
0 denotes the Eulidean projetion onto the interval [0, P
peak
q ] and µq is hosen to satisfy the
power onstraint
∑
k p
⋆
q(k) = P
ave
q (see, e.g., [26℄ for pratial algorithms to ompute suh a µq).
The struture of the Nash equilibria in (23) states that the optimal transmission strategy of eah user
leads to a diagonalizing transmission with a proper power alloation, after pre/post multipliation of the
waterlling solution by matrix G
♯
q. Similarly to G1, the onditions for the uniqueness of the NE of game
G2 an be obtained, building on the interpretation of the waterlling solutions in (23) as matrix projetion
[13℄. As expeted, the NE of the game is unique, provided that the interferene generated by seondary
users is not too high.
4 MIMO Asynhronous Iterative Waterlling Algorithm
In Setion 3 we have shown that the optimal resoure alloation among seondary users in hierarhial
ognitive networks orresponds to an equilibrium of the system, where all the users have maximized
their own rates, without hampering the ommuniations of primary users. Sine there is no reason to
expet a system to be initially at the equilibrium, the fundamental problem beomes to nd a proedure
that reahes suh an equilibrium from non-equilibrium states. In this setion, we fous on algorithms
that onverge to these equilibria. Sine we are interested in a deentralized implementation, where no
signaling among seondary and primary users is allowed, we onsider only totally distributed iterative
algorithms, where eah user ats independently of the others to optimize his own transmission strategy
while pereiving the other ative users as interferene
More speially, to reah the Nash equilibria of the games introdued in the previous setion, we
propose a fairly general distributed and asynhronous iterative algorithm, alled asynhronous Iterative
WaterFilling Algorithm (IWFA). In this algorithm, all seondary users maximize their own rate [via the
single user MIMO waterlling solution (12) for game G1, (23) for game G2, and the lassial MIMO
waterlling solution for games Gα and G∞℄ in a totally asynhronous way, while keeping the temperature
noise levels in the liensed bands under the required threshold [2℄. Aording to the asynhronous updating
shedule, some users are allowed to update their strategy more frequently than the others, and they might
even perform these updates using outdated information on the interferene aused by the others.
Before introduing the proposed asynhronous MIMO IWFA, we need the following preliminary de-
nitions. We assume, without loss of generality, that the set of times at whih one or more users update
their strategies is the disrete set T = N+ = {0, 1, 2, . . .} . Let Q(n)q denote the ovariane matrix of the
vetor signal transmitted by user q at the n-th iteration, and let Tq ⊆ T denote the set of times n at
whih Q
(n)
q is updated (thus, at time n /∈ Tq, Q(n)q is left unhanged). Let τ qr(n) denote the most reent
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time at whih the interferene from user r is pereived by user q at the n-th iteration (observe that τ qr(n)
satises 0 ≤ τ qr(n) ≤ n). Hene, if user q updates his own ovariane matrix at the n-th iteration, then he
hooses his optimal Q
(n)
q , aording to (12) for game G1 and (23) for game G2, and using the interferene
level aused by
Q
(τq(n))
−q ,
(
Q
(τq1(n))
1 , . . . ,Q
(τqq−1(n))
q−1 ,Q
(τ qq+1(n))
q+1 , . . . ,Q
(τq
Q
(n))
Q
)
. (25)
Some standard onditions in asynhronous onvergene theory that are fullled in any pratial imple-
mentation need to be satised by the shedule {τ qr(n)} and {Tq}; we refer to [13℄ for the details. Using
the above notation, the asynhronous MIMO IWFA is formally desribed in Algorithm 1 below, where
the mapping in (27) is dened as
Tq(Q−q) , W˜Fq
(
H˜HqqR
−1
−qH˜qq
)
, q = 1, · · · , Q, (26)
with W˜Fq (·) given in (12) if the algorithm is applied to game G1, and it is dened as
Tq(Q−q) , G
♯H
q WFq
(
H
H
qqR
−1
−qHqq
)
G♯q, q = 1, · · · , Q,
with WFq (·) given in (23) if the algorithm is applied to game G2. The mapping Tq(Q−q) redues to the
lassial MIMO waterlling solution [19℄ if games Gα and G∞ are onsidered.
Algorithm 1: MIMO Asynhronous IWFA
Set n = 0 and Q
(0)
q = any feasible point;
for n = 0 : Nit
Q(n+1)q =

 Tq
(
Q
(τq(n))
−q
)
, if n ∈ Tq,
Q
(n)
q , otherwise;
∀q = 1, · · · , Q (27)
end
Convergene of the asynhronous IWFA is studied in [13, 14℄ (see also [11, 12℄ for speial ases of the
algorithm), where it was proved that the algorithm onverges to the NE of the proposed games under
the same onditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The proposed asynhronous IWFA
ontains as speial ases a plethora of algorithms, eah one obtained by a possible hoie of the shedule
{τ qr(n)}, {Tq}. The sequential [2, 11, 27, 28℄ and simultaneous [11℄-[13℄ IWFAs are just two examples
of the proposed general framework. The important result stated in [11℄-[13℄ is that all the algorithms
resulting as speial ases of the asynhronous MIMO IWFA are guaranteed to reah the unique NE of
game under the same set of onvergene onditions, sine onvergene onditions do not depend on the
partiular hoie of {Tq} and {τ qr(n)} [13℄.
Moreover all the algorithms obtained from Algorithm 1 have the following desired properties:
- Low omplexity and distributed nature : Even in the presene of null and/or shaping onstraints,
the best response of eah user q an be eiently and loally omputed using a MIMO waterlling based
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Figure 3: Simultaneous vs. sequential IWFA: rates of seondary users versus iterations, obtained by the sequential
IWFA (dashed-line urves) and simultaneous IWFA (solid-line urves).
solution, provided that eah hannelHqq is replaed by the modied hannel H˜qq (if game G1 is onsidered)
or Hqq (if game G2 is onsidered). Thus, Algorithm 1 an be implemented in a distributed way, sine eah
user only needs to measure the overall interferene-plus-noise ovariane matrix R−q and waterll over
H˜HqqR
−1
−qH˜qq [or over H
H
qqR
−1
−qHqq℄.
- Robustness: Algorithm 1 is robust against missing or outdated updates of seondary users. This
feature strongly relaxes the onstraints on the synhronization of the users' updates with respet to those
imposed, for example, by the simultaneous or sequential updating shemes [11℄-[13℄.
- Fast onvergene behavior : The simultaneous version of the proposed algorithm onverges in a very
few iterations, even in networks with many ative seondary users. As an example, in Figure 3 we show
the rate evolution of the of 3 links out 8 seondary users, orresponding to the sequential IWFA and
simultaneous IWFA as a funtion of the iteration index. As expeted, the sequential IWFA is slower
than the simultaneous IWFA, espeially if the number of ative seondary users is large, sine eah user
is fored to wait for all the users sheduled in advane, before updating his own ovariane matrix. This
intuition is formalized in [11℄, where the authors provided the expression of the asymptoti onvergent
fator of both the sequential and simultaneous IWFAs.
- Control of the radiated interferene: Thanks to the game theoretial formulation inluding null
and/or soft shaping onstraints, the proposed asynhronous IWFA does not suer of the main drawbak
of the lassial sequential IWFA [27℄, i.e., the violation of the interferene temperature limits [2℄.
Figure 4 shows an example of the optimal resoure alloation based on the game theoretial for-
mulation G1, for a ognitive MIMO network omposed by two primary users and two seondary users,
sharing the same spetrum and spae. Seondary users are equipped with four transmit/reeive an-
tennas, plaed in uniform linear arrays ritially spaed at half of the wavelength of the passband
transmitted signal. For the sake of simpliity, we assumed that the hannels between the transmitter
and the reeiver of the seondary users have three physial paths (one line-of-sight and two reeted
paths) as shown in Figure 4(a). To preserve the QoS of primary users' transmissions, null onstraints
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Figure 4: Optimal transmit beamforming patterns at the NE of game G1 [subplot (b)℄ for a ognitive MIMO
network omposed by two primary and two seondary users [subplot (a)℄.
are imposed to seondary users in the (line-of-sight) diretions of primary users' reeivers [see sub-
plot (a)℄. For the senario shown in the gure, one null onstraint for eah player is imposed along
the transmit diretions φ1 = pi/2 and φ2 = −5pi/12. This an be done hoosing for eah player q
the matrix Uq in (21) oiniding with the spatial signature vetor in the transmit diretion φq, i.e.,
Uq = [1, exp(−j2pi∆tq sin(φq)), exp(−j2pi2∆tq sin(φq)), exp(−j2pi3∆tq sin(φq))]T , with ∆tq = 1/2 denot-
ing the normalized (by the signal wavelength) transmit antenna separation and q = 1, 2. In Figure 4(b),
we plot the transmit beamforming patterns, assoiated to the eigenvetors of the optimal ovariane ma-
trix of the two seondary users at the NE, obtained using Algorithm 1. In eah radiation diagram plot,
solid (blue) and dashed (blak) line urves refer to the two eigenvetors orresponding to the nonzero
eigenvalues (arranged in inreasing order) of the optimal ovariane matrix [reall that, beause of the
null onstraints, the equivalent hannel matrix H˜qq in (21) has rank equal to 2℄. Observe that the null
onstraints guarantee that at the NE no power is radiated by the two seondary transmitters along the
diretions φ1 (for transmitted one) and φ2 (for transmitted two), showing that in the MIMO ase, the or-
thogonality among primary and seondary users an be reahed in the spae rather than in the frequeny
domain, implying that primary and seondary users may share frequeny bands, if this is allowed by FCC
spetrum poliies.
5 Speial Cases
The MIMO game theoreti formulation proposed in the previous setions provides a general and unied
framework for studying the resoure alloation problem based on rate maximization in hierarhial CR
networks, where primary and seondary users oexist. In this setion, we speialize the results to two
senarios of interest: 1) the spetrum sharing problem among primary and seondary users transmitting
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over SISO frequeny-seletive hannels; and 2) the MIMO transeivers design of heterogeneous systems
sharing the same spetrum over unliensed bands.
5.1 Spetrum sharing over SISO frequeny-seletive hannels with spetral mask
onstraints
The blok transmission over SISO frequeny-seletive hannels is obtained from the I/O model in (1),
when eah hannel matrix Hrq is a N×N Toeplitz irulant matrix, Rnq is a N×N diagonal matrix N is
the length of the transmitted blok (see, e.g., [10℄). This leads to the following eigendeomposition for eah
hannel Hrq = WDrqW
H
, where W is the normalized IFFT matrix, i.e., [W]ij , e
j2π(i−1)(j−1)/N /
√
N
for i, j = 1, . . . , N and Drq is a N ×N diagonal matrix, where [Drq]kk , Hrq(k) is the frequeny-response
of the hannel between soure r and destination q. Within this setup, we fous on game G1 given in (8),
but similar results ould be obtained if game G2, Gα or G∞ were onsidered instead. In the ase of SISO
frequeny-seletive hannels, game G1 an be rewritten as:
maximize
Qq0
log det
(
I+HHqqR
−1
−qHqqQq
)
subject to Tr(Qq) ≤ Pq[
WHQqW
]
kk
≤ pmaxq (k), ∀k = 1, · · · , N,
∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (28)
where {pmaxq (k)} is the set of spetral mask onstraints, that an be used to impose shaping (and thus also
null) onstraints on the transmit power spetral density (PSD) of seondary users over liensed/unliensed
bands.
Nash equilibria: The solutions of the game in (28) have the following struture [10℄:
Q⋆q = WDiag(p
⋆
q)W
H , ∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (29)
where p⋆q , (p
⋆
q(k))
N
k=1 is the solution to the following set of xed-point equations
p⋆q = wfq(p
⋆
−q) , ∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (30)
with the waterlling vetor operator wfq (·) dened as
[wfq (p−q)]k ,
[
µq −
1 +
∑
r 6=q |Hrq(k)|2 pr(k)
|Hqq(k)|2
]pmaxq (k)
0
, k = 1, · · · , N, (31)
where µq is hosen to satisfy the power onstraint with equality
∑
k p
⋆
q(k) = Pq.
Equation (29) states that, in the ase of SISO frequeny-seletive hannels, a NE is reahed using,
for eah user, a multiarrier strategy (i.e., the diagonal transmission strategy through the frequeny
bins), with a proper power alloation. This simpliation with respet to the general MIMO ase, is a
onsequene of the property that all hannel Toeplitz irulant matries are diagonalized by the same
matrix, i.e., the IFFT matrix W, that does not depend on the hannel realization.
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Interestingly, multiarrier transmission with a proper power alloation for eah user is still the opti-
mal transmission strategy if in (28) instead of the information rate, one onsiders the maximization of
the transmission rate using nite order onstellations and under the same onstraints as in (28) plus a
onstraint on the average error probability. Using the gap approximation analysis, the optimal power
alloation is still given by the waterlling solution (31), where eah hannel transfer funtion |Hqq(k)|2 is
replaed by |Hqq(k)|2 /Γq, where Γq ≥ 1 is the gap [10℄. The gap depends only on the family of onstella-
tion and on error probability onstraint Pe,q; for M -QAM onstellations, for example, the resulting gap
is Γq = (Q−1(Pe,q/4))2/3 (see, e.g., [29℄).
Reahing a NE of the game in (28) satises a ompetitive optimality priniple, but, in general, multiple
equilibria may exist, so that one is never sure about whih equilibrium is really reahed. Suient
onditions on the MUI that guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium have been proposed in the
literature [10℄-[12℄ and [27, 28℄. Among all, one of the two following onditions is suient for the
uniqueness of the NE:
∑
r 6=q
max
k
∣∣H¯rq(k)∣∣2∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2
d2qq
d2rq
< 1, ∀q = 1, · · · , Q, and ∀k = 1, · · · , N, (32)
∑
r 6=q
max
k
∣∣H¯rq(k)∣∣2∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2
d2qq
d2rq
< 1, ∀r = 1, · · · , Q, and ∀k = 1, · · · , N, (33)
where we have introdued the normalized hannel transfer funtions Hrq(k) , H¯rq(k)/d
2
rq , ∀r, q, with drq
indiating the distane between transmitter of the r-th link and the reeiver of the q-th link. From (32)-
(33), it follows that, as expeted, the uniqueness of NE is ensured if seondary users are suiently far
apart from eah other. In fat, from (32)-(33) for example, one infers that there exists a minimum distane
beyond whih the uniqueness of NE is guaranteed, orresponding to the maximum level of interferene
that may be tolerated by the users. Speially, ondition (32) imposes a onstraint on the maximum
amount of interferene that eah reeiver an tolerate; whereas (33) introdues an upper bound on the
maximum level of interferene that eah transmitter is allowed to generate. Interestingly, the uniqueness
of the equilibrium does not depend on the interferene generated by the transmissions of primary users.
Asynhronous IWFA: To reah the equilibrium of the game, seondary users an perform the asyn-
hronous IWFA based on the mapping in (31). This algorithm an be obtained diretly from Algorithm
1, as speial ase. It was proved in [12℄ that, e.g., under onditions (32)-(33), the asynhronous IWFA
based on mapping (31) onverges to the unique NE of game in (28) as Nit→ ∞, for any set of feasible
initial onditions and updating shedule.
In Figure 5, we show an example of the optimal power alloation in SISO frequeny-seletive hannels
at the NE, obtained using the proposed asynhronous IWFA, for a CR system omposed by one primary
user [subplot (a)℄ and two seondary users [subplot (b)℄, subjet to null onstraints over liensed bands,
spetral mask onstraints and transmit power onstraints. In eah plot, solid and dashed-dot line urves
refer to optimal PSD of eah link and PSD of the MUI plus thermal noise, normalized by the hannel
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Figure 5: Spetrum sharing among one primary [subplot (a)℄ and two seondary users [subplot (b)℄: Optimal
PSD of eah link (solid lines), and PSD of the MUI-plus-thermal noise normalized by the hannel transfer funtion
square modulus of the link (dashed-dot line).
transfer funtion square modulus of the link, respetively. In this example, there is a band A (from 50
to 300 frequeny bins) alloated to an ative primary user; there is then a band B (from 300 to 400
frequeny bins) alloated to liensed users, but temporarily unused; the rest of the spetrum, denoted as
C, is vaant. The temporarily void band B an be utilized by seondary users, provided that they do not
overome a maximum tolerable spetral density. The optimal power alloations shown in Figure 5 are
the result of running the simultaneous IWFA. We an observe that the seondary users do not transmit
over band A and they alloate their power over both bands B and C, respeting a power spetral density
limitation over band B.
5.2 MIMO transeiver design of heterogeneous systems in unliensed bands
We onsider now on a senario where multiple unliensed MIMO ognitive users share the same unliensed
spetrum and geographial area. The availability of MIMO transeivers learly enrihes the possibilities
for spetrum sharing as it adds the extra spatial degrees of freedom. In unliensed bands, there are no
interferene onstraints to be satised by the users. Thus, the game theoretial formulation as given in
(8), without onsidering the null onstraints, seems the most appropriate to study the resoure alloation
problem in this senario. In the following we refer to game G1 assuming taitly that the null onstraints
are removed.
Similarly to the SISO ase, suient onditions for the uniqueness of the NE are given by one of the
two following set of onditions (more general onditions are given in [13℄):
Low MUI reeived:
∑
r 6=q
ρ
(
HHrqH
−H
qq H
−1
qq Hrq
)
< 1, ∀q = 1, · · · , Q, (34)
Low MUI generated:
∑
q 6=r
ρ
(
HHrqH
−H
qq H
−1
qq Hrq
)
< 1, ∀r = 1, · · · , Q. (35)
Conditions (34)-(35) quantify how muh MUI an be tolerated by the systems to guarantee the uniqueness
of the NE. Interestingly, (32)-(33) and most of the onditions known in the literature [11, 27, 28℄ for the
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uniqueness of the NE of the rate-maximization game in SISO frequeny-seletive interferene hannels
and OFDM transmission ome naturally from (34)-(35) as speial ases.
The Nash equilibria of game G1 an be reahed using the asynhronous IWFA desribed in Algorithm 1,
whose onvergene is guaranteed under onditions (34)-(35), for any set of initial onditions and updating
shedule of the users.
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Figure 6: Sum-Rate of the users versus the inter-pair distane drq/dqq; drq = dqr, drr = dqq = 1, ∀r, q, for dierent
numbers of transmit/reeive antennas.
In Figure 6 we show an example of the benets of MIMO transeivers in the ognitive radio ontext.
We plot in the gure the sum-rate of a two-user frequeny-seletive MIMO system as a funtion of the
inter-pair distane among the links, for dierent number of transmit/reeive antennas. The rate urves are
averaged over 500 independent hannel realizations, whose taps are simulated as i.i.d. Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and unit variane. For the sake of simpliity, the system is assumed to be
symmetri, i.e., the transmitters have the same power budget and the interferene links are at the same
distane (i.e., drq = dqr, ∀q, r), so that the ross hannel gains are omparable in average sense. From the
gure one infers that, as for isolated single-user systems or multiple aess/broadast hannels, also in
MIMO interferene hannels, inreasing the number of antennas at both the transmitter and the reeiver
side leads to a better performane. The interesting result, oming from Figure 6, is that the inremental
gain due to the use of multiple transmit/reeive antennas is almost independent of the interferene level
in the system, sine the MIMO (inremental) gains in the high-interferene ase (small values of drq/dqq)
almost oinide with the orresponding (inremental) gains obtained in the low-interferene ase (large
values of drq/dqq), at least for the system simulated in Figure 6. This desired property is due to the
fat that the MIMO hannel provides more degrees of freedom for eah user than those available in the
SISO hannel, that an be explored to nd out the best partition of the available resoures for eah user,
possibly anelling the MUI.
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6 Conlusion and Diretions for Further Developments
In this paper we have proposed a signal proessing approah to the design of CR systems, using a
ompetitive optimality priniple, based on game theory. We have addressed and solved some of the
hallenging issues in CR, namely: 1) the establishment of onditions guaranteeing that the dynamial
interation among ognitive nodes, under onstraints on the transmit spetral mask and on interferene
indued to primary users, admits a (possibly unique) equilibrium; and 2) the design of deentralized
algorithms able to reah the equilibrium points, with minimal oordination among the nodes. We have
seen how basi signal proessing tools suh as subspae projetors play a fundamental role. The spetral
mask onstraints have been in fat used in a very broad sense, meaning that the projetion of the
transmitted signal along presribed subspaes should be null (null onstraints) or below a given threshold
(soft onstraints). The onventional spetral mask onstraints an be seen as a simple ase of this general
set-up, valid for SISO hannels and using as subspaes the spae spanned by the IFFT vetors with
frequenies falling in the guard bands. This general setup enompasses multiantenna MIMO systems,
whih is partiularly useful for CR, as it provides the additional spatial degrees of freedom to ontrol the
interferene generated by the ognitive users.
Of ourse, this eld of researh is full of interesting further diretions worth of investigation. The
NE points derived in this paper were ditated by the need of nding totally deentralized algorithms
with minimal oordination among the nodes. However, the NE points may not be Pareto-eient. This
raises the issue of how to move from the NE towards the Pareto optimal trade-o surfae, still using a
deentralized approah. Game theory itself provides a series of strategies to move from ineient Nash
equilibria towards Pareto-eient solutions, still using a deentralized approah, through, for example,
repeated games, where the players learn from their past hoies [9℄. Examples of suh games are the aution
games, where the autioneer (primary users) dynamially determine resoure alloation and pries for the
bidders (seondary users), depending on tra demands, QoS and supply/demand urves, as evidened
in a series of works (see, e.g., [30, 31, 32℄). Repeated games may also take the form of negotiations
between primary and seondary users, with primary users willing to lease part of their spetrum to
seondary users, under suitable remunerations [16℄ or under the availability given by seondary users
to establish ooperative links with the primary users to improve their QoS [33℄. Competitive priing for
spetrum sharing was also proposed as an oligopoly market where a few primary users oer spetrum aess
opportunities to seondary users [34℄. An interesting issue will be the integration of our asynhronous
IWFA in repeated (aution) games, where the optimization onsiders a set of primary users oering the
lease of portion of their resoures to a set of seondary users, as a funtion of tra demands, QoS
requirements and physial onstraints.
Our searh for the uniqueness onditions of the NE and the onvergene onditions of our proposed
algorithms fored us to simplify the model. For example, we assumed that eah reeiver has an error-free
short-term predition of the hannel. This assumption was neessary for the mathematial tratability
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of the problem and to be able to provide losed-form expressions of our ndings. This is useful to gain a
full understanding of the problem, without relying on simulation results only. However, in pratie, the
transmitter is only able to aquire an estimate aeted by errors and, based on that, to form a predition
of the short term future evolution. An interesting extension of the presented approah onsists then in
taking into aount the eets of estimation errors and developing robust strategies. This is partiularly
relevant in CR systems beause the strategy adopted by the ognitive users may be more or less aggressive
depending on the reliability of their hannel sensing.
Channel identiation has a long history in signal proessing. The problem beomes espeially hal-
lenging in CR networks, where the estimation of the hannel voids, for example, must be very aurate.
Nevertheless, the estimation itself may be improved by exploiting the availability of a network of nodes
that ould, in priniple, ooperate to get better and better estimates of the eletromagneti environment,
working as a sensor network of ognitive nodes.
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